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INDIANS-JURISDICTION AND GOVERNMENT OF INDIAN COUNTRY AND
RESERVATIONS-TRIBAL TAXATION DOES NOT PRECLUDE STATES'
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE AN OTHERWISE VALID STATE TAX.
The State of Washington sought to extend three of its taxes to
the Colville, Makah, Lummi, and Yakima Indian Reservations.1
The three taxes included a cigarette excise tax which was to be
collected by Indian retailers making on-reservation cigarette sales
to non-Indians or Indian residents who were not members of the
reservation's tribe. 2 The state sought to enforce this tax by seizing
untaxed cigarettes bound for the reservation. 3 Also, a retail sales
tax was to be collected by Indian retailers on sales to non-Indians
and Indians who were not members of the reservation's governing
tribe. 4 Finally, a motor vehicle excise tax was to be collected on
vehicles owned by the tribes and their members which were used
both on and off the reservations. 5 Additionally, the state sought to
1. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). Two of the taxes were
to be levied on the sale of cigarettes, one being a cigarette excise tax, and the other a sales tax on sales
of personal property, including cigarettes, occurring within the state. Id. at 141-42. The third tax was
a motor vehicle excise tax, to be paid for the privilege of using a motor vehicle within the state. Id. at
142.
2. Id. at 141. The cigarette excise tax is levied "upon the sale, use, consumption, handling or
distribution of all cigarettes ..." by sections 82.24.020, 28A.47.440, and 73.32.130 of the Revised
Code of Washington Annotated, at a combined rate of 8 mills per cigarette, or $1.60 per carton.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 82.24.020, 28A.47.440 (Supp. 1980);-WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S
73.32.130 (1962).
The district court found that the legal incidence of the tax is on the first event which may be
constitutionally subjected to it. Confederated Tribes of Colville v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339,
1352-55 (E.D. Wash. 1978). When the transaction is a sale by an Indian to a non-Indian, the first
taxable event is the use, consumption, or possession by the non-Indian purchaser. Id. The legal
incidence of the tax is therefore on the non-Indian purchaser. Id.
3. 447 U.S. at 142. The tribes are required by section 82.24.260 of the Revised Code of
Washington Annotated to collect the state tax with respect to sales to non-tribal members. WASH.
REV, CODE ANN. § 82.24.260 (Supp. 1980). There is apparently no statutory authority for the seizure
of untaxed cigarettes. See 447 U.S. at 142.
4. 447 U.S. at 142. The sales tax is imposed upon sales of personal property, including
cigarettes, by section 82.08.020, and under section 82.08.050, the retailer is required to collect the
tax from the purchaser. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 82.08.020, 82.08.050 (Supp. 1980).
5. 447 U.S. at 142. An excise tax is imposed by section 82.44.020 "for the privilege of using in
the state any motor vehicle ... , " and a similar tax is imposed "on the owner of any travel trailer or
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assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over the reservations. 6 Tribal
ordinances already existed which taxed cigarette sales occurring on
the reservations. 7 The tribes8 brought suit in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington to have the taxes
declared unenforceable and to have the assumption of jurisdiction
declared invalid. 9 The three judge district court 0 found that the
state motor vehicle excise tax, the retail sales tax as applied to the
sale of cigarettes, and the cigarette tax were invalid. 1 The court
further found that the state's assumption of civil and criminal
jurisdiction over two of the reservations was unconstitutional. 12
The United States Supreme Court, affirming in part and reversing
in part, held that Washington's cigarette and sales taxes may validly
be applied to on-reservation purchases by non-members of the
governing tribe,' 3 that the state may not impose its motor vehicle
camper for the privilege of using such travel trailer or camper in the state. by section 82.50.400.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §5 82.44.020, 82.50.400 (Supp. 1980).
6. 446 F. Supp. at 1366. Under Chapter 37.12 of the Revised Code of Washington Annotated,
the state assumed jurisdiction over Indians on non-trust lands and non-Indians on trust and non-
trust lands to the fullest extent possible under Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1360 (1976). See WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. Chapter 37.12 (1964). With regard to trust lands, the state assumed jurisdiction
over Indians in eight subject matter areas, including compulsory school attendance, public
assistance, and domestic relations, unless the tribe consented to the state's jurisdiction under the
provisions of Washington Revised Code Annotated section 37.12.021; then the state would assume
jurisdiction to the same extent that it exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction elsewhere within the
state. 446 F. Supp. at 1366.
The Colville tribe had consented to state jurisdiction, but the Makah and Lummi tribes had
not. Id. The state therefore assumed total jurisdiction over the Colville reservation, but only partial
jurisdiction over the Makah and Lummi tribes. Id. The Makah and Lummi tribes challenged the
partial assumption of jurisdiction on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
7. 447 U.S. at 144-45. Each of the tribes has enacted taxing ordinances which have been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The Colville, Lummi, and Makah tribes distribute
cigarettes purchased with tribal funds to tobacco outlets and collect the wholesale price and tax from
the outlet operators. The taxing ordinances require that the tax be passed on to the ultimate
consumer of the cigarettes. The Yakima tribe, however, purchases cigarettes from out-of-state
dealers and then sells to licensed retailers, receiving a mark-up and the tax collected from them. The
tribe does not require the tax to be added to the sales price. Id.
8. 446 F. Supp. at 1344. Two separate cases raising related issues were consolidated by the
district court. Id. The first case, Confederated Tribes ofColville v. Washington, was filed by the Colville,
Makah, and Lummi tribes. Id. The second, United States v. Washington, was commenced by the
United States on behalf of the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Nation. Id. at 1367-68.
In each action, the plaintiffs contended that Washington's cigarette excise and sales taxes could not
be lawfully imposed upon sales made by smokeshops located on the various reservations. Id. at 1345,
1368. In Colville, the tribes also attacked the state's motor vehicle excise tax and the state's
assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the reservations. Id. at 1315.
9. Id. at 1345.
10. Id. A three judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). This
statute was subsequently repealed by Act ofAugust 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 119.
Because this action was pending when the statute was repealed, it was not affected. Id. at § 7, 90 Stat.
1120.
11. 446 F. Supp. at 1367.
12. Id. at 1366. This claim was based on a holding in which the jurisdictional statute allowing
the stafe to assume partial jurisdiction within the reservations based on the trust or non-trust status
of the land had been held violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 552 F. 2d 1332, 1336 (9th cir. 1977). Before the decision in
Colville, however, the jurisdictional statute was found not to violate the equal protection clause.
Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979).
13. 447 U.S. at 160.
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excise tax upon vehicles owned by the tribes or their members and
used both on and off the reservations, 14 and that the state may
assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Makah and Lummi
reservations. 5 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
The Indian tribes have a unique status under the provisions of
the United States Constitution. The Constitution grants Congress
the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 16 At the
same time, it grants treaty-making powers to the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate.' 7 These two provisions form
the basis for the dual nature of the legal status of the American
Indian first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia. 18 Marshall described the Indian tribes as "nations" subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government,' 9 thereby
developing the theories of tribal sovereignty and federal pre-
emption as rationales for the preclusion of state regulation of tribal
affairs. 20 Two early cases applied these doctrines in determining
state jurisdiction to tax Indians. 2'
The power to levy taxes is an inherent attribute of tribal
sovereignty. 22 Although Indian tribes no longer possess the full
attributes of sovereignty, they still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn expressly by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.2 3 Not
only do Indian tribes possess the authority to tax transactions
occurring on reservations involving tribal members, but they also
may exercise this power over non-members transacting business
14. Id. at 163,
15. Id. at 164,
16. U.S. CoNsi. art. 1, S 8. Article I, section 8, clause 3 provides that Congress shall have
power "Itlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribe;... "Id.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 2. Article II, section 2, clause 2 provides that the President "shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, ... " Id.
18. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
19. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
20. Id. at 559. The Court in Worcester noted in dicta that the Indian tribes have been considered
"distinct, independent political communities . . ", having territorial boundaries within which their
authority i§ exclusively determined by the federal government. Id. Worcester recognized that Indian
tribes are independent political communities, thereby providing a justification for the denial of state
authority over tribal affairs. Id. See McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignity: Accormodatin g Tribal,
State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. I. Rvv. 357. 360-65 (1978). Also developed in
Worcester was the general theory of federa, pre-emption which holds that the power of the states to
conduct relations with Indian tribes has been pre-empted by the federal government's extensive
control over Indians. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558-59.
21. See The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 737 (1866). In these cases, the states were prevented from imposing taxes on lands held by the
Indians that were protected from state taxation. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 771-72, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at
757,759, 761.
22. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 98-9 (8th Cir. 1956).
23. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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within the borders of the reservation. 24 Furthermore, section 16 of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,25 which confirmed tribal
powers under "existing law," 26 provides evidence of congressional
intent that tribes possess taxing powers.
As a general rule, Indians and their property, located both on
and off reservations, are subject to federal taxes and other general
acts of Congress 27 in the same manner as are non-Indians. This
appears to be due to the paramount authority of Congress over the
Indians. 28 For example, an Indian is not exempt from paying
federal income tax simply because he is an Indian. 29 When a
special Indian right is involved, however, the subject of which is
governed by a treaty or other remedial legislation, Indian law
principles dictate that the specific right will govern over the federal
legislation. 30 There are several notable exceptions to this general
rule. The most important one is the General Allotment Act of 1887,
which exempts from federal taxation allotments made to individual
Indians under the Act. 3 The Act has been construed to extend this
tax exemption to income derived directly from allotted land. 32 The
Act, however, has been held not to provide the Indian lessee of land
held in trust by the United States for other Indians with an income
tax exemption on income derived from the leased land. 33
24. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1905); Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
25. 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (1963).
26. Id. Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is one of the two provisions dealing
with tribal organization. It provides as follows:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to
organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and
bylaws....
In addition to all powers vested in any tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the
following rights and powers....
Id.
27. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1970). "[G]eneral
Acts of Congress [which would include the Internal Revenue Code] apply to Indians as well as all
others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary .... Id at 120.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
29. LaFontaine v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Service, 533 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1976).
30. 362 U.S. at 115-18.
31. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-358 (1963). Under the General Allotment Act, the United States was to
hold allotted land in trust for an allottee's benefit for 25 years. Id. § 348. During the trust period,
allottees are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States but become subject to state law
when fee patents issue. Id. S 349.
32. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956). The Court in Squire held that since section 6 of the
General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C.A. 5 349 (1963), allows for the removal of all restrictions
on the "sale, incumbrance, or taxation" of allotted land when the land is granted in fee simple to the
allottee, id. at 7, Congress intended allotments to be free from taxes until a patent in fee is issued. 351
U.S. at 7-8. As the proceeds subject to tax in Squire were derived from the sale of timber on allotted
land, and as the value of the land was derived from the timber, the tax exemption afforded by the
General Allotment Act should have applied to the timber. Id. at 9-10.
33. United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1980). The United States Court of
Appeals in Anderson distinguished that case from Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), on the basis of
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Non-Indians and their property, located both on and off an
Indian reservation, are generally subject to state taxation. State
taxes may validly be applied to individual non-Indians or to
transactions between non-Indians within the borders of an Indian
reservation.34 In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes35 the
United States Supreme Court allowed state taxation of on-
reservation cigarette sales made by an Indian to non-Indians when
there was a statutory presumption that the tax was a direct tax on
the non-Indian consumer. 36 The Court found that the state may
require the Indian retailer to collect the state cigarette sales tax
from the non-Indian buyer and keep detailed records of taxable
sales for the state. 37 The Court reasoned that the co.'cction
requirement did not interfere with the tribes' right to be free from
state regulation because it placed only a minimal burden upon the
Indian seller while preventing nonpayment of a valid state tax by
non-Indians.38
Whereas Moe established that the state may validly tax non-
Indians located both on and off an Indian reservation, the same is
not true with respect to Indians. 39  Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries are, absent express law to the contrary,
subject to nondiscriminatory state laws otherwise applicable to all
citizens of the state.40 Nevertheless, a state may not tax on-
reservation activities involving reservation Indians or Indian
ownership of the trust land. The court stated that the purpose of the General Allotment Act was to
provide the allottee with unencumbered land, and was not meant to benefit him "because he was an
Indian, or to benefit Indians generally." Id. at 914 (citations omitted).
34. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). Since such taxes are not levied upon the lands or
privileges of the Indians, they do not violate the Indians' rights. Id. at 273. Also, such taxes do
conflict with Congress' power to regulate commerce because they are too remote and too indirect to
be a tax burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 274.
35. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
36. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976). The Montana
statute at issue in Moe provided that the cigarette tax "shall be conclusively presumed to be [al direct
[ . . tax] on the retail consumer precollected for the purpose of convenience and facility only."
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. S 84-5606 (1) (1947) (currently condified at MONT. CODE ANN. 5 16-11-112
(1979)).
37. 425 U.S. at 483. Since the smokeshops were selling to non-Indians upon whom the state
could validly impose its tax, the Moe Court held that it was permissible for the state to require the
Indian retailer to add the tax to the sale price. Id.
38. Id. In the absence of such a requirement, non-Indians would be able to avoid payment of a
lawful tax. Since the requirement did not frustrate tribal self-government or conflict with any federal
statute, the Court found that the state's interest in collecting the tax outweighed the tribe's interest in
not collecting it. Id.
39. Id. at 480. For example, in Moe the Court held that the state could not impose a personal
property tax on personal property located within a reservation, apply its vendor licensing fee to on-
reservation Indian vendors, or tax cigarette sales by Indians to other reservation Indians. Id. These
Indian tax immunities do not constitute invidious racial discrimination against non-Indians due to
the history of special treatment of Indians by the federal government. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535 (1974). In Morton the Court had held that "[als long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed." Id. at 555.
40. Mescalero Apache Tribe v..ones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
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reservation lands unless congressional intent provides the power to
do So. 4 1
Courts have used several theories to justify on-reservation
Indian immunity from state taxation. The first is the federal
instrumentality doctrine.42 Under this doctrine, the Indian tribes
are made federal instrumentalities as a result of the federal
government's great interest in them. 43 Therefore, by imposing a
tax on an Indian tribe, a state would in effect be taxing the federal
government, which is impermissible. 44 With the deterioration of
the inter-governmental immunity doctrine, however, the federal
instrumentality doctrine has been rejected,4 5 and as recently as
1973 the Supreme Court declined to revitalize it.46
In 1959 the United States Supreme Court resurrected Worcester
v. Georgia.7 by recognizing that either tribal sovereignty, in the form
of political independence, or pre-emption by federal statute or
treaty could prevent the exercise of state control in Indian affairs.
In Williams v. Lee"8 the Court stated that "absent governing Acts
41. Id. Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1360 (1976), a statute extending criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the states to certain Indian reservations, however, is not a congressional grant of
taxing power authorizing the states to tax reservation Indians. Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota,
426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976). The Supreme Court in Bryan examined the legislative history of the law
and concluded that the primary concern of Congress in enacting Public Law 280 was the problem of
lawlessness on certain Indian reservations. Id. at 379. Failure to specifically mention the power of
taxation when extending the states' civil jurisdiction to Indian reservations indicated to the Court
that the general civil jurisdiction did not include the power to tax. Id. at 390.
42. This theory was first applied to state tax immunity in TheNew York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
761 (1866).
43. U.S. v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1903). In Rickert the Court held that permanent
improvements made to allotted land held in trust by the United States, and livestock used on the land
were not subject to state taxation. Id. at 442-43. The Court reasoned that the federal government's
interest in the property was so great that, by taxing the property, the state was taxing the federal
government. Id. at 438-39.
44. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922). In Gillespie the United States Supreme Court
extended the federal instrumentality doctrine to exempt a non-Indian lessee of restricted and allotted
lands from a state income tax on income derived from sale ofoil produced under the lease. Id. at 506.
45. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). In Mountain Producers Corp.
the Court overruled its decision in Gillespie by allowing the imposition of federal income tax on
income earned by a lessee of oil and gas interests from the State of Wyoming. Id. at 387. Following
this decision, the Court permitted state taxation of a non-Indian lessee of Indian land held in trust for
the Indians by the United States. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
46. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 155 (1973). In Mescalero the state sought to
tax the gross receipts of an off-reservation ski resort operated by the tribe on land leased from the
federal government under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C.A. § 461 (1963). The
Court noted that since its decision in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., Indian lands and the
proceeds therefrom are not automatically exempt from state taxation, and "[tihe question whether
immunity shall be extended in situations like these is essentially legislative in character." 336 U.S. at
365-66. The Court found in Mescalero that the Indian Reorganization Act was not intended by
Congress to make off-reservation tribal enterprises arms of the federal government, 411 U.S. at 152-
53, and therefore rejeted the tribe's broad claim of tax immunity. Id. at 155.
47. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1836). The Court in Worcester developed the general theory of federal
pre-emption when it held that the power of the states to regulate Indian tribes had been pre-empted
by the federal government. Id. at 595-96. Additionally, the political independence of the tribes was
recognized as a justification for prohibiting state interference in Indian affairs. Id. at 559.
48. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The Arizona Supreme Court had held that, as no act of Congress had
expressly forbidden it from doing so, it was free to exercise jurisdiction over civil suits by non-Indians
against Indians in actions arising on an Indian reservation. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d
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of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and to be ruled by them. . . . 49A number of Supreme Court cases
since Williams have utilized the "infringement on tribal self
government test" to prohibit the states from exercising taxing
authority over tribal members and land when federal pre-emption
was not at issue, or as an alternative to federal pre-emption. 50
The recent trend, however, has been to utilize the doctrine of
federal pre-emption to determine the validity of state taxing
schemes. 51 Under this doctrine, the courts examine relevant
treaties and statutes to determine whether the federal government
has regulated the subject matter or area sought to be taxed by the
state. If regulation by the federal government exists, the state tax is
considered to have been pre-empted, and is therefore invalid. 52 In
Worcester v. Georgia the Supreme Court had decided that because the
Constitution had given the federal government exclusive authority
to regulate Indian affairs, the state had no authority to enforce its
laws on Indians or Indian lands when the state laws conflicted with
federal legislation, federal treaties, or the general power to regulate
commerce with the Indians." Many recent cases involving state
regulation of Indians have been analyzed by the Court in terms of
998 (1958). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's holding.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
49. 358 U.S. at 220.
50. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (Williams infringement test applied in the
absence of federal pre-emption to vest in tribal court the exclusive jurisdiction over tribal adoption
proceeding); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (decided on federal
pre-emption grounds but noted that if the Williams test were applied infringement would probably be
found).
51. Perhaps the first case in which the Court articulated this trend was McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Comm 'n, in which it stated as follows:
ITIhe trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to
state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption .... The modern cases
thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look
instead to applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power....
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). The Court also stated that in
almost all cases the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction are defined by federal treaties and
statutes, and that therefore the extent of federal pre-emption and tribal sovereignty in the absence of
treaty obligations or federal legislation is a moot question. Id. at 172 n. 8. See Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 146 (1973) The Court stated that in deciding whether state taxation of
Indians was permissible the question is "whether paramount federal law permits these taxes to be
levied." Id. at 146.
52. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). In McClanahan the
withholding of money from an Indian's earned wages for the payment of state income taxes was
found to be impermissible when it was measured against the federal statutes involved. Id. at 179. In
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), the Court found that comprehensive
congressional regulation of Indian trade and traders existed, and consequently invalidated the levy of
Arizona's gross receipts tax on a trading post. Id, at 686-87.
53. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1836). Worcester appears to have been
based in large part upon the supremacy of federal treaties and stautes under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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the federal pre-emption doctrine, 54 with the Court rarely upholding
the state regulation. 55
When dealing with conflicts between state and tribal interests
since Williams, the Court has incorporated the element of tribal
sovereignty into its pre-emption doctrine. 56  Although tribal
sovereignty is not used to resolve issues in modern cases when
federal pre-emption is involved, tribal sovereignty is important to
provide "a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and
federal statutes must be read. "5
There is no rigid rule which resolves the issue of whether a
state law may validly be applied to an Indian reservation or tribal
members. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker58 is a recent United
States Supreme Court decision which addressed the issue of
whether the state may extend its taxing authority to on-reservation
commerce involving non-Indians. The Court delineated two
factors which led it to conclude that federal law pre-empted the
exercise of state authority. 59 The factors the Court considered were
whether the federal government had undertaken comprehensive
regulation of the activity and whether the policies underlying the
federal scheme had been threatened by state regulation.6 0 Also
54. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (Indian trade
and traders found to have been comprehensively regulated by federal statute); McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (federal treaties and statutes found to preclude taxation
of income earned by an Indian on a reservation). See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980) (holding that a state may not apply motor vehicle carrier license and use fuel
taxes to on-reservation operations of non-Indian corporations) and Central Machinery Co. v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (holding that the state transaction privilege tax may not
be applied on sales by a non-Indian corporation to an Indian tribe occurring on the reservation).
55. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). Kake was one of the few
cases in which state regulation was upheld under the Court's pre-emption analysis. The Court in
Kake affirmed the denial of an injunction against enforcement of a state law prohibiting the use of
salmon traps. Id. at 76. The state seized traps which belonged to the Indians after the Indians had
obtained permits from the Secretary of the Interior, the Corps of Engineers, and the Forest Service to
use the traps. Id. at 61. The Court found no direct conflict between the state and federal regulations,
as Congress had not authorized the use of the traps and the Secretary of the Interior had no power to
authorize their use. Id. at 76.
56. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). The Court noted the
trend away from "the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal pre-emption...," but refused to ignore the Indian sovereignty doctrine
altogether. Id.
57. Id. Stating this concept another way, the Court said that "the relevant treat[ies] and statutes
are [to be] read with th[e] tradition of sovereignty in mind." Id. at 173.
58. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). In White Mountain Apache the state sought to apply its motor carrier
license and use fuel taxes to an enterprise consisting of non-Indian corporations authorized to do
business within the state and operating solely on an Indian reservation. The United States Supreme
Court held that the state taxes had been pre-empted by federal law. Id. at 138. The court found that
federal regulation of the harvesting of Indian timber "is so pervasive as to preclude the additional
burdens sought to be imposed in this case." Id. at 148.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court noted that there was no room for the state's taxes since the federal regulatory
scheme was comprehensive with regard to the harvesting of Indian timber. The Court further noted
that the federal policies underlying the regulatory scheme would be obstructed by the taxes. Id.
Additionally, state justification for the regulation was examined. Id. at 148-49. The Court did not
feel, however, that the state's generalized interest in raising revenue was sufficient to justify the
assessment of the taxes or intrusion into the federal scheme. Id. at 150.
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noted was the fact that no "regulatory function or service
performed by the State that would justify the assessment of taxes for
activities on Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation" had
been shown, which the Court said was "equally important" to its
analysis. 61 The Court recognized that in each case the nature of the
federal, state, and tribal interests at stake will determine whether a
state would be violating federal law by exercising its authority. 61
In 1976 the United States Supreme Court held in Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes63 that a state may sometimes
impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of Indian
retailers doing business on the reservation. 64 The Court also ruled
that a state may impose at least minimal burdens on the Indian
retailer to aid in its collection and enforcement of the tax. 65 Four
years later the Court once again addressed "the intricate problem
of state taxation of matters involving Indian tribes and their
members' '66 in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville.67 In
Colville the Court considered a state taxing scheme similar to the
cigarette and sales taxes which were involved in Moe. 68
Unlike in Moe, however, each of the tribes involved in Colville
had already imposed its own tax on cigarette sales, thereby raising
revenue for the tribe. 69 The Court found that the tribal taxes were
valid, reasoning that the tribes' power to tax non-Indians engaged
in on-reservation economic activities was not implicitly divested by
virtue of the dependent status of Indian tribes, 70 unlike criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 71 The power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its
members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty retained by the
61. Id. at 148-49.
62. Id. at 145. In Central Machinery Co, v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), the Supreme
Court found that because the Federal Indian Trader statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1963),
governed the transaction that the state was attempting to tax, the state tax had been pre-empted and
therefore could not validly be imposed. 448 U.S. at 165-66. Because a federal statute was found
controlling, no consideration was given to tribal self-government or balancing of interests. Id.
63. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
64. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481-82 (1976). Due to
conflicting federal statutes, however, the state does not have the power, under the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, to collect cigarette sales taxes on reservation sales by Indians to
Indians. 425 U.S. at 480-81.
65. 425 U.S. at 483.
66. 447 U.S. at 138.
67. 447 U.S. 134(1980).
68. Id. at 141-42. In Colville the state sought to compel Indian retailers to collect state cigarette
sales and excise taxes on sales made on the reservation by Indian retailers to non-Indian buyers. Id.
at 141. In Moe the Court had held that the state sales tax could validly be imposed on sales by Indian
retailers to non-Indians that occur on the reservation, 425 U.S. at 480, and that the state could
impose its collection requirements on the Indian retailer. Id, at 482-83.
69. 447 U.S. at 144-45.
70. Id. at 153-54.
71. Id. at 153, citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Supreme
3ourt held in Oliphant that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians necessarily had been lost when the
tribes had submitted to "the overriding sovereignty of the United States." Id. at 210.
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tribes unless divested by federal law or by implication of their
dependent status. 72 The Court found that no federal law had
divested the tribes' power to tax, and tribal taxation was not
inconsistent with overriding federal governmental interests. 73
While it upheld tribal power to tax on-reservation
transactions, the Court also held that the state may tax on-
reservation sales to non-Indians. 74 Relying on the holding in Moe,
and noting that the only tribal "resource" marketed was an
exemption from state taxation, 75 the Court felt that the economic
impact of lost revenue to the tribes was insufficient to warrant
exempting these sales from taxation. 76 The Court did not find that
the state taxes were pre-empted by federal statutes regulating
Indian affairs, 77  inconsistent with the right of Indian self-
government, 78 or invalid under the Indian Commerce Clause, as
the tribes had argued. 79 The Court reasoned that since they were
imposed by two district sovereigns, the two taxes were not in direct
conflict, and therefore the state tax did not infringe upon tribal self-
government. 80
The Court found that the state is permitted not only to tax
sales to non-Indian purchasers at reservation smokeshops, but it
also has the power to tax Indian residents of the reservation who are
not enrolled members of the governing tribe. 81 Thus, because no
federal statute has pre-empted Washington's power to tax the non-
member Indians,8 2 and because they are not members of the
72. 447 U.S. at 152.
73. Id. at 153.
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. at 155.
76. Id. at 156.
77. Id. at 155-56. The Court, in examining the relevant federal statutes, looked not for evidence
of federal control or concern for promoting economic development or tribal self-government, but
looked instead for congressional intent to grant to the tribe an artificial competitive advantage over
all other businesses within the state. When it did not find this, it went on to state that the tribes may
be able to pre-empt state taxation if the federal government were to delegate this power to the tribes.
Mere approval of the tribal taxing ordinances was not, however, enough for the Court to infer such a
delegation. Id. at 156.
78. Id. at 156. The Court stated, based on McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179
(1973), that the principle of tribal self-government involves an accommodation between the interests
of the tribes and the federal government on one side and the interests of the state on the other. 447
U.S. at 156. The tribal interest in raising revenue is greatest when the money is derived from on-
reservation activities involving the tribe, and when the taxpayer receives tribal services. The state's
interest is strongest when the tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer receives
state services. Since the state is attempting to tax persons who do not receive tribal services, and who
would buy their cigarettes off the reservation where the state could collect its tax if there were no tax
exemption, the Court concluded that the state interest was greater than the tribal interest in this case.
Id. at 156-57.
79. 447 U.S. at 157. Since Washington's taxes are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to
all transactions within the state, the Court concluded that the tax did not burden commerce that
would exist on the reservation if it weren't for the tax exemption. Id.
80. Id. at 158.
81. Id. at 160.
82. Id. The Court stated that the mere fact that a person living on a reservation is an "Indian"
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governing tribe, taxing them does not contravene principles of
tribal self-government. 83
Relying on its decision in Moe, the Court upheld the state's
record keeping requirements. 84 Moe established that the states may
impose at least minimal burdens on Indian businesses in order to
collect and enforce their taxes. 85 Therefore, the tribes bear the
burden of showing that the record keeping requirements are
invalid. 86 The tribes had failed to demonstrate that these steps were
not reasonably necessary to prevent fraudulent sales, and
consequently the requirements were upheld.87
The Court also found that Washington's interest in enforcing
its valid taxes was sufficient to justify the seizure of unstamped
cigarettes. 88 Thus, the Court concluded that when tribes have
refused to cooperate in collecting the state taxes, the state may seize
the cigarettes before they arrive on the reservation to prevent
evasion of its valid tax. 89 Because the seizures occur off the
reservation, where the state has more power over Indian affairs
than on the reservation,9" tribal interests are not compromised. 91
In addition to the cigarette taxes, the state sought to impose a
tax on motor vehicles owned by the tribes or their members and
used both on and off the reservation. 92 The Court stated that the
state may tax only the use of these vehicles off the reservation. 93
for the purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C.A. S 479 (1963), does not
exempt this person from state taxation if he is not a member of the governing tribe. 447 U.S. at 161.
The Court found no congressional intent to exempt these people from taxation. Id.
83. 447 U.S. at 162. As a result, the Court found that the state's interest in taxing outweighed
any interest the tribe might have in preventing the state taxation. Id.
84. Id. at 160.
85. 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). In Moe the tax collection requirement was seen as "a minimal
burden designed to avoid the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians ... will avoid payment of a
concededly lawful tax." Id. The Court found nothing in this burden "which frustrates tribal self-
government . . . or runs afoul of any congressional enactment dealing with the affairs of reservation
Indians .... " Id. (citations omitted).
86. 447 U.S. at 160.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 161. The tribes had argued that since the sales by wholesalers to the tribal
smokeshops were exempt from state taxes, no tax was due while the cigarettes were in transit, and
therefore the seizures were not justified. Id.
89. Id. at 161-62. The Court did not address the issue of whether the state could seize cigarettes
after they had arrived on the reservation in order to obtain payment of taxes due from sales to non-
Indians, as this question was not properly before it. Id. at 162.
90. Id. at 162, citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v.Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
91. 447 U.S. at 162.
92. Id. at 162. This tax was to be imposed for the "privilege" of using the vehicle within the
state. It was to be levied on all motor vehicles, including mobile homes, campers, and travel trailers.
Id.
93. Id. at 163. The Court relied on Moe and McClanahan in reaching this decision. Id. In Moe a
tax on personal property located within the reservation was found to conflict with federal statutes and
was therefore held invalid. 425 U.S. at 481-82. The Court in Colville determined that the only
difference between the tax being challenged in that case and the tax involved in Moe was their labels.
447 U.S. at 163. In McClanahan the Court ruled that a state has no jurisdiction over Indians and
land located on an Indian reservation. As a result, the state has no authority to tax activities
occurring on a reservation. 411 U.S. at 181.
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The motor vehicle tax was therefore held invalid as written, but the
Court suggested that a tax tailored to include only off-reservation
use might be upheld. 94
The Court ruled that the issue of the state's assumption of civil
and criminal jurisdiction over the Makah and Lummi reservations
was controlled by its decision in Washington v. Yakima Indian
Nation.95 In Yakima the Court concluded that the checkerboard
jurisdictional pattern that results from the state's assumption of full
jurisdiction over consenting tribes and partial jurisdiction over
non-consenting tribes was an attempt to accommodate both state
and tribal interests and did not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 96
Although three opinions concurring in part and dissenting in
part were filed with the majority opinion, 97 Colville clearly indicates
that states may tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-members
of the tribe, even when the tribe imposes a similar tax on the same
sales. 98 The Court, however, appears unwilling to permit state
regulation of on-reservation activity involving only Indians, to the
extent that state laws taxing an Indian activity that occurs both on
94. 447 U.S. at 163-64.
95. 439 U.S. 463 (1979). In Yakima Indian Nation the Court upheld the validity of the
Washington jurisdictional statute at issue in Colville. Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979).
96. 439 U.S. at 501-02. The Court found that for the jurisdictional statute to be valid, no
compelling state interest is required, because classifications based on tribal status and land tenure are
not suspect. Additionally, no fundamental right is abridged, and a rational relationship exists
between the jurisdictional scheme and the state's interest in protecting non-Indians living within the
reservation. Therefore, the Court found the Washington statute valid. Id.
97. 447 U.S. at 164-90. Justices Brennan and Marshall felt that the state's cigarette taxing
scheme was invalid because it interfered with principles of tribal sovereignty and had been pre-
empted by federally approved tribal taxes. Id. at 165 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justices Brennan and Marshall also felt that the state could not require the Indian sellers to keep
records of taxable and non-taxable sales because there had been no showing of utility or necessity by
the state. Id. at 173-74.
.Justice Stewart felt that, under the Commerce Clause, when the state and tribal taxes
conflict, the state should have to credit the tribal tax against its own. Id. at 175 (Stewart, J.,
concurring and dissenting). According to Justice Stewart, however, only the taxes imposed on the
Colville, Makah, and Lummi reservations conflicted with the state tax, since on these reservations
the tribal taxing ordinances required that the tax be passed on to the ultimate consumer, while no
such requirement was imposed by the Yakima taxing ordinance. Id. at 176.
Justice Rehnquist believed that the doctrine controlling the case was "pre-emption analysis
based on the principle that Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent . . . at least
absent discriminatory state action prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause." Id. at 177
(Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Rehnquist felt that, absent
discrimination, the issue is merely one of congressional intent. Id. After analyzing previous tax cases
and the facts in Colville, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the state tax involved was "a permissible
nondiscriminatory exercise of state sovereign authority which has not been pre-empted by
Congress." Id. at 181.
Addressing the motor vehicle excise tax, Justice Rehnquist felt that, since the state may validly
tax vehicles used off the reservation, and since the record was inadequate to show whether vehicles
used solely on the reservation would be taxed, the question should have been remanded to determine
whether the state would be willing to change its taxing scheme to avoid taxing vehicles that never
leave the reservation. Id. at 189-90.
98. Id. at 158-59. The Court found that the tribes and the state had concurrent jurisdiction to
tax sales made on the reservation to non-members of the tribe. Id. at 159.
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and off a reservation will be considered invalid unless an attempt is
made to tax only that portion occurring off the reservation. 99
Taxes imposed by Indian tribes on cigarette sales to non-
Indians provide an important source of revenue to many Indian
tribes. 100 A large number of sales made by Indian tobacco dealers
are to non-Indians who travel to the reservation to take advantage
of the tribal tax exemption.101 As a result of the Colville decision, it
is likely that fewer non-Indians will make on-reservation cigarette
purchases, because without the tax exemption, the price of
cigarettes sold on and off the reservation will be the same. The
consequence of this will be the loss to the tribes of much-needed tax
revenues. 102
The Court's decisions in Colville and Moe to allow state
taxation of on-reservation sales to non-Indians may be explained by
the Court's apparent reluctance to allow the tribes to market a tax
exemption to people who otherwise are not entitled to one. 103 It is
unclear whether a state could validly tax an activity in which the
tribe has a significant interest or a resource derived from the
reservation itself, such as a natural resource. 104
By allowing the state to intrude upon on-reservation sales to
non-Indians, Colville may have the symbolic effect of decreasing the
sovereign and independent status of Indian tribes. 10 5 This effect
99. Id. at 163-64. In holding that on-reservation use of vehicles by Indians was immune from
state taxation, the Court re-emphasized the importance of location (either on or off the reservation)
in determining state taxing authority. Id.
100. Id. at 144-45. During a four-year period, the Colville tribe collected $266,000 in cigarette
taxes, the Lummi tribe collected $54,000, and the Makah tribe collected $13,000. In 1975 the
Yakima tribe realized $278,000 from cigarette sales. Id.
101. Id. at 145.
102. Id. at 156-57. The Court noted that the tribes had an interest in raising revenue but that
the state also "has a legitimate governmental interest in raising revenues. Id. at 157. Since the
revenue raised by the tribe from the sale of cigarettes to non-members was revenue the state would
raise but for the tax exemption, the Court felt that the state tax should be allowed to stand. Id.
103. Id. at 155; Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (Court
refused to allow the Indians to benefit from cigarette sales made to non-Indians as a result of the
Indian immunity from state taxation); Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernadino, 543 F.2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977) (county tax on the possessory interests of non-
Indian lessees of reservation land held valid since the tax was not pre-empted by federal statue and
since tribal self-government was affected only in the sense that the tribe would receive less revenue as
a result of their inability to market their tax exemption).
104. 447 U.S. at 155-59. The Court did not feel that by imposing its taxes on sales to non-
Indians the state would "infringe the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them." Id. at 156. The Court also did not feel that the tribal tax pre-empted the state tax
since both the tribe and state were "free to impose [their] taxes without ousting the other." Id. at
158.
105. In Merrion v, .icarilla Apache Tribe a tribal severance tax imposed on non-Indian lessees
producing oil and gas on reservation land was upheld. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d
537, 544 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980). InJicarilla the state was also levying a
severance tax on the oil and gas. 617 F.2d at 546. The right to tax had been granted to the state by
Congress when it had enacted 25 U.S.C.A. S 398c. 617 F.2d. at 547. This statute grants to the state
the right to tax the production of oil and gas on executive order reservations. 25 U.S.C.A. 5 398c
(1963). The statute was held not to preclude tribal taxation. 617 F.2d at 547. It is therefore arguable
that both the tribe and the state have the authority to tax resources derived on the reservation.
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should be seen as somewhat muted, however, by the Court's
upholding of the tribes' power to tax non-Indians and its
recognition of a broad measure of tribal civil jurisdiction over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands. 1 06
Based on the Moe and Colville decisions a state may, by
carefully drafting its tobacco products tax statute, tax sales made on
reservations by tribal smokeshops to non-Indians and Indians
residing on the reservation who are not members of the governing
tribe. 107 The state may also require the Indian sellers to collect the
tax for the state. 0 8 This tax may be collected regardless of whether
the tribe has an ordinance imposing a tax on these sales. 109
Currently, the excise tax levied on the sale of cigarettes in
North Dakota is imposed on the first sale of cigarettes occurring
within the state after their movement in interstate commerce has
ended. 110 If the first sale occurring after interstate commerce has
ended is to an Indian retailer or wholesaler engaged in on-
reservation business, the state may not tax the cigarettes or
require that North Dakota tax stamps be affixed to them.1 1 If,
however, the cigarettes are purchased by the Indian dealer from a
distributor within North Dakota, the cigarettes will already bear
state tax stamps.112 This results from a state law which requires
licensed cigarette distributors in North Dakota to attach tax stamps
to cigarettes as soon as they are received in stock,1 13 making
possession of unstamped cigarettes by a distributor unlawful. 114
Additionally, state law prohibits the transporting of unstamped
cigarettes within the state once interstate commerce has ended.1 15
106. 447 U.S. at 152-54.
107. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 475-81 (1976) (holding that
a state may impose a tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing business on the
reservation but that the same tax may not be imposed on Indians): Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980) (holding that the state may impose its tax on sales
made to Indian residents on the reservation who are not members of the governing tribe).
108. 447 U.S. at 159-60; Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483
(1976) (holding that the state may require that the Indian seller collect a validly imposed state tax on
sales to non-Indians).
109. 447 U.S. at 154-59. See Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernadino, 543 F.2d 1253,
1258 (9th cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977) (both the tribe and the state permitted to impose
a possessory interest tax on non-Indian lessees of trust property).
110. 1978 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 203, 205 (April 11, 1978).
111. Id. at 208.
112. Id.
113. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 57-36-07 (1972). North Dakota Century Code section 57-36-07,
subsection 2 states that "i]mmediately upon receipt by the licensee, each package of cigarettes,
except as otherwise provided in this chapter, shall have affixed thereto securely a suitable stamp
denoting the tax thereon." Id.
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-36-07 (1972). North Dakota Century Code section 57-36-07,
subsection 3 states that "the possession of any unstamped package of cigarettes, within or without
any premises, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this chapter." Id.
115. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-36-13 (1972). North Dakota Century Code section 57-36-13 states
that '[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to transport into, receive, carry or move from place to
place in this state, by automobile, truck, boat, airplane, conveyance, vehicle or other means of
transportation, except in the course of interstate commerce, any unstamped cigarettes." Id.
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No provision of the law allows for the possession or transporting of
unstamped cigarettes by distributors for sale to on-reservation
Indian dealers. 116
At the present time, once the Indian dealer has acquired
cigarettes which do not bear North Dakota tax stamps, he cannot
be compelled to collect the state cigarette tax on sales made to non-
Indians. 117 State law makes only the consumer responsible for
paying the consumer's cigarette use tax on cigarettes not bearing
North Dakota tax stamps. 118 Current state law also does not require
that the Indian distributor or dealer report the names and addresses
of his non-Indian customers, or keep records of the number of
cigarettes sold to Indians or the number sold to non-Indians. 19
The North Dakota Legislature has not amended its cigarette
taxing scheme to comply with Moe. 120 Perhaps it will now modify
the law in light of the Colville decision and the United States
Supreme Court's declaration of the state's right to tax cigarette
sales to non-Indians already taxed by the tribe. 12'
In addition to the tobacco products taxes, North Dakota
imposes an excise tax on "any motor vehicle purchased or acquired
either in or outside the State of North Dakota for use on the streets
and highways of this state and required to be registered under the
laws of this state.' ' 22 No exemption from registration is provided
for Indian owned vehicles. 123 Therefore, reservation Indians within
North Dakota are required to pay this tax. In Moe and Colville,
Montana and Washington motor vehicle use and excise taxes were
116. 1978 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 203, 205, 210 (April 11, 1978).
117. Id. at 212.
118. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-36-27 (1972). North Dakota Century Code section 57-36-27 states
in relevant part as follows: "l. A tax is hereby imposed upon the use or storage by consumers of
cigarettes in this state, and upon such consumers, at the following rates: . ..2. This tax shall not
apply if the tax imposed by section 57-36-06 has been paid. ... Id. This section further provides
that the consumer is required to file a tax return directly to the tax commissioner. Id.
119. 1978 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 203, 205,212 (April 11, 1978).
120. 425 U.S. at 483. The Montana statute involved in Moe states that the cigarette tax "shall
be conclusively presumed to be [al direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for the purpose of
convenience and facility only." MONT. REV. CODE ANN. S 84-5606 (1) (1947). The North Dakota
tax, although precollected, is an excise tax imposed on the first sale of cigarettes occurring within
North Dakota. 1978 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 203, 205, 207 (April 11, 1978). As a result, if the first sale
occuring within the state is to an Indian, no tax can be collected from the Indian even if the cigarettes
are later sold to a non-Indian. Id. at 212. In North Dakota only the consumer is required to pay the
consumer's use tax on cigarettes to which cigarette stamps are not attached. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-
36-27 (1972). If the North Dakota tax were on the consumer, under Moe, the Indian dealer could be
required to collect it for the state, thereby preventing evasion of the tax by non-Indian purchasers.
See 425 U.S. at 483.
121. 447 U.S. at 157-59.
122. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-40.3-02 (1972).
123. N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-04-18 (1972). North Dakota Century Code section 39-04-18
provides a list of vehicles that are exempt from registration. Id. No mention is made of Indian-owned
vehicles, except subsection 2(b) provides an exemption for "motor vehicles owned or in possession of
Indian mission schools or by this state or any of its agencies." Id. This exemption appears to be
premised on the fact that the vehicle belongs to an instrumentality of the state (a school district)
rather than to Indians. Id.
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declared invalid when imposed upon vehicles owned by Indian
tribes and their members, used both on and off the reservation. 
24
Unless the North Dakota Legislature amends this statute with
regard to Indians, tailoring it to reflect the actual off-reservation
use,' 25 it is likely that the statute, if challenged, would be held
invalid as applied to Indians.1 6 Since state law provides for the
refund of any motor vehicle excise tax paid in error or not due, 27 it
may be possible for reservation Indians to recover tax paid during a
retroactive period of three years by presenting proof to the tax
commissioner that the tax was paid and that a refund is
warranted. 128
As a result of Colville, it is likely that reservation
smokeshops selling tobacco products to non-member Indians and
non-Indians will become a thing of the past. Although it is now
clear that the tribes may tax non-Indians, tribal taxes do not oust or
pre-empt valid state taxes, at least in the limited area of cigarette
taxation. In the future, in order to avoid a similar result when
conflicts between other state and tribal taxes arise, it may be to the
advantage of both the tribe and the state to reach some type of out-
of-court agreement.
JOANNE LIEBMANN
124. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480 (1976); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 163-64 (1980).
125. 447 U.S. at 163. The Court also suggested that a motor vehicle excise tax may be upheld if
"something more than mere nomenclature" were varied. Id. at 163-64. One possibility may be to
develop categories. For example, for vehicles driven solely on-reservation (100% on-reservation
use), there would be no tax; if driven off-reservation to commute to work (90% on-reservation use),
there would be a pro rata tax. A taxing scheme such as this would probably be difficult to administer.
126. In a recent opinion, the North Dakota attorney general indicated that it is impossible to
determine with certainty whether the motor vehicle excise tax is constitutional as applied to Indian
tribes and their resident-enrolled members. Op. N.D. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 21, 1980) (A.G. Allen I.
Olson, whether North Dakota's motor vehicle excise tax applies to Indian tribes or their resident-
enrolled members). The attorney general recommended that the law be regarded as constitutional
and that the tax be collected until the legislature or courts require otherwise. Id.
127. N.D. CENT. CooE § 57-40.4-01 (1972).
128. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-40.4-01 & 57-40.4-02 (1972).
256
